Hartford Accident Indemnity v. Lawrence Fitzpatrick by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-4-2011 
Hartford Accident Indemnity v. Lawrence Fitzpatrick 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"Hartford Accident Indemnity v. Lawrence Fitzpatrick" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 1181. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1181 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 08-3650 
_____________ 
 
In re:  GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,  
et al., 
 
                       Debtors. 
------------------------------ 
 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY;  
FIRST STATE INSURANCE COMPANY CO;  
TWIN CITY FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY;  
CENTURY INDEMNITY COMPANY, as successor to 
CIGNA Specialty Company, formerly known as California 
Union Insurance Company; WESTCHESTER FIRE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, for itself and for International  
Insurance Company (now known as TIG Insurance Company) 
(by operation of novation all rights and obligations under the 
policies have been transferred from International Insurance 
Co. to Westchester Fire Insurance Co.); NATIONAL UNION 
FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA; 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, First State 
Insurance Company, and Twin City Fire Insurance Company 
(collectively, “Hartford”1); Century Indemnity Company and 
Westchester Fire Insurance Company (collectively, 
“Century”2); and National Union Fire Insurance Company of 
Pittsburgh, PA, Insurance Company of the State of 
Pennsylvania, Lexington Insurance Company, American 
Home Insurance Company, and other entities related to 
American International Group, Inc. (collectively, “AIG”) 
appeal from an order entered by the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denying 
Hartford and Century standing to challenge the confirmation 
of a plan of reorganization filed by Global Industrial 
Technologies, Inc. (“GIT”) and affirming the plan‟s 
confirmation.
3
  Among other things, the District Court, 
                                              
      
1
 The Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc., is a 
parent corporation of all three insurers but is not party to this 
appeal.  
2
 Century Indemnity Company and Westchester Fire 
Insurance Company are both subsidiaries of parent company 
ACE Limited, which is not participating in this appeal. 
     
3
 The appellees are GIT, the Official Committee of 
Asbestos Creditors and Unsecured Trade Creditors, and the 
Legal Representatives for Future Asbestos and Silica 
Claimants.  In this opinion, when referring to arguments made 
6 
 
following the reasoning of the Bankruptcy Court, determined 
that Hartford and Century lacked standing to participate in 
bankruptcy proceedings concerning GIT‟s Chapter 11 
reorganization.  Because we conclude that Hartford and 
Century meet the standing requirements to be heard in those 
proceedings and that further factual development may aid in 
the resolution of other issues raised on appeal, we will vacate 
the District Court‟s order and have the case remanded to the 
Bankruptcy Court.  The decision we announce is no more far-
reaching than this: when a federal court gives its approval to a 
plan that allows a party to put its hands into other people‟s 
pockets, the ones with the pockets are entitled to be fully 
heard and to have their legitimate objections addressed.  In 
short, they at least have bankruptcy standing.
4
  
                                                                                                     
by all of the appellees, we attribute them simply to GIT for 
convenience.      
4
 We note at the outset our disagreement with our 
dissenting colleagues‟ characterization of this case as one that 
developed in the District and Bankruptcy Courts “with the 
full participation of the excess insurers.”  (Dissent slip op. at 
1.)  If the insurers, including appellants Harford and Century, 
had been granted standing by the Bankruptcy Court, it could 
rightly be said that they had had full participation.  But, 
though they had some opportunity to voice their objections, 
as is more fully described herein, they were denied standing 
to object to GIT‟s plan of reorganization.  That refusal to give 
them their proper place at the litigation table is the whole 
point of this appeal.   
7 
 
I. Background 
 
 This case arises from Chapter 11 petitions filed in 
2002 by GIT and certain of its subsidiaries.  GIT was formed 
in 1995 as a publicly traded holding company for several 
businesses, including manufacturers and sellers of refractory 
products.
5
  In 1998, as part of its strategy to grow and develop 
its refractory business, GIT acquired A.P. Green Industries, 
Inc. (“APG”),6 a long-time manufacturer and seller of 
refractory products.   
 
Before the mid-1970s, some of the products that APG 
manufactured had asbestos as an ingredient.  Although APG 
had stopped including asbestos in its products by 1976, its 
prior asbestos use triggered an avalanche of personal injury 
lawsuits.  Beginning in the 1980s and continuing through 
early 2002, APG spent approximately $448 million in 
resolving over 200,000 asbestos-related claims.  In addition to 
those claims, APG had, as of February 2002, approximately 
235,000 additional asbestos-related claims still pending 
against it.  From the portion of those pending claims that had 
been liquidated, APG had unpaid obligations totaling $491 
million.   
 
During that same period, APG also faced silica-related 
personal injury claims, though on a vastly smaller scale.  
                                              
5
 Refractory products are “construction-type materials 
specifically designed and manufactured for use in high-
temperature applications.”  (App. at 87) 
6
 For convenience, we refer to APG and its related 
entities collectively as “APG.” 
8 
 
From 1977 to 2002, APG dealt with 23 silica-related lawsuits.  
Travelers Indemnity Company spent approximately $312,000 
settling or litigating those suits on APG‟s behalf, with APG 
contributing $50,000 towards settlement of one of the suits.  
As of February 2002, APG had one silica-related suit, a class 
action consisting of 169 claims, pending against it in Texas 
state court.   
 
In February of 2002, GIT, APG, and certain related 
entities (collectively, the “debtors”) sought protection under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code because of adverse 
business conditions and the staggering number of asbestos-
related claims pending against them.  The debtors did not 
identify silica-related liability as a motivation for seeking 
bankruptcy relief.   
 
For their plan of reorganization (the “Plan”) to relieve 
them of asbestos-related liability, the debtors needed to obtain 
approval of the Plan by 75% of the then-current asbestos 
claimants.
7
  While the record is less than clear, it seems that, 
to solicit the required votes, the debtors necessarily reached 
out to those asbestos claimants‟ attorneys, many of whom 
also represented persons with silica-related claims against 
other companies.
8
  The availability of hundreds of millions of 
                                              
7
 Under 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb), at least 
75% of a debtor‟s asbestos claimants must support an 
asbestos settlement trust, if a reorganization plan containing 
such a trust is to be confirmed. 
8
 We have before acknowledged that “[t]he realities of 
securing favorable votes from thousands of claimants to meet 
the 75% approval requirement forces debtors to work closely 
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dollars of insurance coverage was evidently assumed and 
ultimately featured prominently in the debtors‟ proposed 
Plan.  The Plan called for entry of a channeling injunction 
(the “Asbestos Injunction”) pursuant to which asbestos-
related claims that had or could be brought against the debtors 
would instead be channeled to a trust specifically created to 
assess and resolve claims (the “APG Asbestos Trust”).9  The 
Plan also called for entry of an injunction (the “Silica 
Injunction”) channeling silica-related claims to a silica trust 
(the “APG Silica Trust”; together with the APG Asbestos 
Trust, the “Trusts”).10  Insurance was to fund both Trusts, 
                                                                                                     
with the few attorneys who represent large numbers of injured 
claimants.”  In re Congoleum Corp., 426 F.3d 675, 680 (3d 
Cir. 2005). 
9
 Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 524(g), a bankruptcy court 
may enjoin asbestos-related litigation against a debtor or 
qualifying third party and channel the claims into a settlement 
trust if the court determines (1) “the debtor is likely to be 
subject to substantial future demands for payment arising out 
of” asbestos-related claims; (2) “the actual amounts, numbers, 
and timing of such future demands cannot be determined”; 
and (3) “pursuit of such demands outside the [trust] is likely 
to threaten the [reorganization] plan‟s purpose to deal 
equitably with claims and future demands.”  11 U.S.C. 
§ 24(g)(2)(B)(ii). 
10
 While § 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code only 
expressly authorizes the establishment of a trust and the entry 
of a channeling injunction to address asbestos liability, 
several courts have concluded that trusts and channeling 
injunctions may be authorized under § 105(a) and 
§ 1123(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code to address other mass 
10 
 
either in the form of cash from APG‟s settlement of disputes 
involving certain insurance policies or, with respect to the 
APG Silica Trust, in the form of insurance coverage under 
certain policies to be assigned to the APG Silica Trust by 
APG.
11
  Hartford and Century were among the insurers whose 
policies were to be assigned to the APG Silica Trust.
12
      
                                                                                                     
tort liabilities where a trust and channeling injunction would 
play “an important part in the debtor‟s reorganization plan.”  
SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. (In re Drexel 
Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.), 960 F.2d 285, 293 (2d Cir. 
1992) (authorizing channeling injunction for securities class 
action claims); see also Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow 
Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648 (6th 
Cir. 2002) (authorizing channeling injunction for silicone 
breast implant claims); Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. 
Robbins Co.), 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989) (authorizing 
channeling injunction for Dalkon Shield birth control device 
claims).  Under the debtors‟ proposed Plan, only silica claims 
based on pre-petition exposure would be channeled to the 
APG Silica Trust.  Claims based on post-petition exposure 
were to become the responsibility of the reorganized debtors.   
11
 Several insurers disputed their obligations under 
policies issued to APG.  APG subsequently reached 
settlement agreements with those insurers, releasing them 
from liability under their policies.  In exchange, APG 
received approximately $365.6 million, of which $31.5 
million was to be used to fund the APG Silica Trust.  The 
APG Silica Trust was otherwise to be funded by the 
assignment of certain insurance policies that debtors believe 
provide coverage for silica-related liabilities.   
12
 Because we are only concerned at this point with 
11 
 
Regarding the rights of Hartford, Century, and the 
other insurers whose policies were to be assigned to the APG 
Silica Trust, the Plan provided that nothing therein or in Plan-
related documents or in the Bankruptcy Court‟s confirmation 
order would preclude those insurers from asserting any rights 
or defenses under the policies, except those related to “anti-
assignment provisions.”  Hartford‟s and Century‟s coverage 
obligations to the APG Silica Trust would still be contingent 
on the APG Silica Trust incurring liability and any claims for 
reimbursement overcoming Hartford‟s and Century‟s 
coverage defenses.   
 
For the Plan to be approved as designed (i.e., with the 
inclusion of the Silica Injunction), the debtors needed to show 
that the Plan‟s resolution of silica-related claims is necessary 
or appropriate under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), which, under our 
precedent, requires showing with specificity that the Silica 
Injunction is both necessary to the reorganization and fair.
13
   
See Gillman v. Continental Airlines (In re Continental 
Airlines), 203 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that a 
third-party injunction would only be proper under § 105(a) if 
                                                                                                     
whether the putative injuries inflicted by the APG Silica Trust 
and Silica Injunction provide bankruptcy standing for 
Hartford and Century, we refer to those injuries only as they 
relate to Hartford and Century, even though those injuries 
would appear to be common to all insurers whose policies 
were assigned to the APG Silica Trust. 
13
 Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that 
“[t]he court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is 
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this 
title.”  11 U.S.C. § 105(a). 
12 
 
the proponents of the injunction demonstrated with specificity 
that such an injunction was both necessary to the 
reorganization and fair).  In practical terms, this meant 
showing that the silica-related liability was sufficiently 
onerous to jeopardize the debtors‟ reorganization if not 
resolved via the Silica Injunction and APG Silica Trust.  See 
id. at 215 (noting that the debtors had failed to show the 
necessity of the injunction where they had not demonstrated 
that the success of the reorganization hinged in any way on 
the issuance of the injunction).   
 
With that as background, the debtors obtained a list of 
silica claimants from another company‟s bankruptcy and then 
solicited confirmation votes from those claimants‟ counsel.  
An explosion of silica claims ensued.  Ultimately, 5,125 votes 
for the debtors‟ Plan were cast on behalf of persons alleging 
that APG was responsible for their claimed silica-related 
injuries.  The majority of those votes were submitted by a 
handful of law firms, with five law firms accounting for 4,039 
votes.  Each of the law firms that submitted votes on behalf of 
silica claimants also submitted votes on behalf of asbestos 
claimants.  The requisite majority of both groups of claimants 
voted in favor of the Plan.   
 
In June 2006, the Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on 
plan confirmation.  Hartford, Century, and AIG (collectively, 
the “Objecting Insurers”) objected to the Plan, asserting that 
the APG Silica Trust and the Silica Injunction were the 
products of collusion with the asbestos claimants‟ counsel 
and, under § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code, were neither 
necessary nor appropriate for the debtors‟ successful 
reorganization.  In response, the Bankruptcy Court continued 
the confirmation hearing and ordered the silica claimants to 
13 
 
provide supplemental information regarding their silica-
related diagnoses, their exposure to APG‟s silica products, 
and any prior diagnoses of or claims for asbestos-related 
diseases.  The claimants then provided several thousand 
supplemental submissions, many of which were duplicative 
or otherwise deficient.  Ultimately 4,626 individual silica 
claims were recognized to be at issue.
14
   
 
 In October 2006, the Bankruptcy Court resumed the 
confirmation hearing, during which the Objecting Insurers 
pressed their reasons for questioning the legitimacy of the 
silica claims.  One set of criticisms stemmed from findings 
provided by the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust 
(the “Manville Trust”), which was established for asbestos-
related claims associated with the bankruptcy of the Johns-
Manville Corporation.   The Manville Trust found that certain 
                                              
14
 At some point after the silica claimant votes were 
solicited, Robert G. Taylor II, P.C., withdrew 489 of the 525 
silica claimant votes that it had cast, explaining that those 
claimants‟ claims had been dismissed in litigation.  That left 
4,636 silica claimants, from which 4,822 supplemental 
submissions were received.  The Objecting Insurers 
concluded, after reviewing the supplemental submissions, that 
196 were duplicates and so, subtracting those from the 4,822 
received, conducted their claims analysis with 4,626 unique 
claims as their starting point.  In contrast, the debtors 
apparently subtracted the 489 withdrawn claimants from the 
5,125 original claimants and conducted their claims analysis 
with 4,636 remaining silica claimants as their starting point.  
For our purposes, the discrepancy between the two starting 
points is immaterial. 
14 
 
physicians‟ diagnoses were not credible and, accordingly, it 
banned those physicians.
15
  The Manville Trust also found 
that certain physicians generated a “high volume” of 
diagnoses that, at a high rate, proved to be inaccurate.  
According to the Objecting Insurers, those Manville Trust 
findings are germane here because, of the silica claimants in 
the GIT bankruptcy who identified a diagnosing physician or 
facility, 56.9% indicate a diagnosis by a physician or facility 
that has been banned by the Manville Trust.  An additional 
27.8% of such claims are suspect, the Objecting Insurers 
argued, because they involve diagnoses by two of the 
physicians singled out by the Manville Trust for being highly 
unreliable.     
 
Another set of criticisms presented to the Bankruptcy 
Court stemmed from findings made in the course of 
multidistrict litigation involving silica products liability.  The 
United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas, which was charged with handling the multidistrict 
litigation, discounted several physicians‟ diagnoses because 
of their diagnostic methods, which the Court described as 
“rang[ing] from questionable to abysmal.”  In re Silica 
Products Liability Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 622 (S.D. Tex. 
2005).  In particular, the Silica Products Court disparaged 
silica claims brought by people who had earlier been 
diagnosed with an asbestos-related disease or had filed an 
asbestos-related claim against an asbestos trust, noting that “a 
                                              
15
 While the record before us is not explicit on this 
point, we understand that the “banning” of physicians means 
that the Manville Trust would not accept claims supported by 
those physicians‟ diagnoses. 
15 
 
golfer is more likely to hit a hole-in-one than an occupational 
medicine specialist is to find a single case of both silicosis 
and asbestosis.”16  Id. at 603.   
 
The Objecting Insurers pointed out to the Bankruptcy 
Court – and the debtors acknowledged – that 55.5% of the 
silica claims at issue in this case involve diagnoses from 
physicians who were discredited by the Silica Products Court.  
The Objecting Insurers further pointed out that more than half 
of the silica claims are from persons who had either been 
diagnosed with an asbestos-related disease or filed an 
asbestos-related claim against an asbestos trust or both, thus 
making their silicosis diagnoses highly suspect.  All told, the 
Bankruptcy Court heard evidence questioning the legitimacy 
of 91.5% of the silica claims made against the debtors.   
 
Notwithstanding that evidence, the Bankruptcy Court 
confirmed the Plan on November 14, 2007, concluding that 
the APG Silica Trust and the Silica Injunction were necessary 
to the debtors‟ reorganization.  The Bankruptcy Court made 
no findings as to the legitimacy of the silica claims, but it did 
credit the debtors‟ projection of future silica claims and 
reasoned that “[w]hether or not [the] claims prove to be 
compensable, [the debtors] must address them, either in the 
tort system with its inherent risks and the possibility that any 
                                              
16
 As an example, the Court noted the questionable 
diagnoses generated by one small diagnostic company, which, 
despite the extreme improbability of persons having both 
silicosis and asbestosis, had purportedly discovered 4,000 
such persons by “park[ing] a van in some parking lots.”  
Silica Products, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 603. 
16 
 
one judgment could be materially adverse and constitute a 
default under its financing covenants, or through a trust.”17   
 
The Bankruptcy Court also determined that Hartford 
and Century lacked standing to object to the Plan.
18
  The 
Court rejected Hartford‟s and Century‟s arguments that they 
had suffered injury from the Plan, concluding that the 
assignment of Hartford‟s and Century‟s policies to the APG 
Silica Trust in contravention of the policies‟ anti-assignment 
provisions was not injurious because the Bankruptcy Code 
and state law rendered those provisions a nullity.  The Court 
further reasoned that any potential financial harm arising out 
of the assignments was too speculative because Hartford and 
Century had not contributed and were not required to 
contribute “anything” to the APG Silica Trust and would still 
be able to assert their coverage defenses and contractual 
                                              
17
 Contrary to the Dissent‟s assertion that “the 
Bankruptcy Court … established the facial legitimacy of [the 
silicosis] claims” (Dissent slip op. at 1), the Court‟s opinion 
shows that it declined to make any findings of legitimacy, and 
its solicitation of proffers from the silica claimants cannot 
credibly be viewed as an endorsement of the claims.  Thus, 
even if we accept the Dissent‟s contention that the Objecting 
Insurers do not challenge the Bankruptcy Court‟s factual 
findings, that does not mean that the facial legitimacy of the 
silica claims has been conceded, as the Dissent seems to 
suggest.  (Id.)  Rather, the factual premise of the Objecting 
Insurers‟ position on appeal remains that the silica claims are 
not legitimate.       
18
 Because AIG was not just an insurer but also a 
creditor, its standing was not contested.   
17 
 
rights if ever faced with putative obligations to reimburse the 
APG Silica Trust on silica-related claims.
19
  The District 
Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court‟s confirmation of the 
plan and its determination that Hartford and Century lacked 
standing to challenge the Plan.   
 
In the timely appeal now before us, the Objecting 
Insurers challenge both the ruling that Hartford and Century 
lacked standing to object to the GIT Plan and the ruling that 
the APG Silica Trust and Silica Injunction are lawful.
20
  Also 
                                              
19
 To say that the Plan does not require Hartford and 
Century to contribute “anything” to the APG Silica Trust is 
an overstatement because, as outlined above, the Plan calls 
for the Hartford‟s and Century‟s policies to be assigned to the 
APG Silica Trust, which is certainly “something.”  Even if we 
were to understand the Bankruptcy Court to mean that 
Hartford and Century are not required to contribute any 
funds, the reality is that, by requiring Hartford and Century to 
provide insurance coverage, the Plan requires them to make 
significant contributions to the APG Silica Trust. 
20 
The Objecting Insurers challenge the Bankruptcy 
Court‟s determination that the APG Silica Trust and the Silica 
Injunction were necessary to the debtors‟ reorganization and 
thus lawful pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105, arguing that the 
debtors faced no significant silica-related liability other than 
that generated through collusion with the claimants‟ counsel.  
Separately, AIG, in its status as a creditor, argues that the 
APG Silica Trust violates both 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(a) and 
502(b)(1).  Specifically, AIG argues that the APG Silica Trust 
violates § 502(b)(1) because its distribution procedures permit 
payment of claims that could not be paid outside of 
18 
 
implicated is the Objecting Insurers‟ standing to bring this 
appeal.
21
 
 
                                                                                                     
bankruptcy – claims that AIG asserts are precluded in the tort 
system because they post-date APG‟s implementation of 
safety measures in 2000.  AIG argues that those distribution 
procedures also violate § 502(a) by divesting AIG, as a party 
in interest, of its right to object to the payment of such claims. 
21 
Although GIT concedes that AIG had standing in the 
Bankruptcy Court, GIT contends that AIG fails the more 
stringent “persons aggrieved” standard for bankruptcy 
appellate standing discussed in In re Combustion 
Engineering, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 215 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(explaining that “[a]ppellate standing in the bankruptcy 
context is more restrictive than Article III standing” and that 
“parties involved in bankruptcy proceedings” may 
nonetheless lack standing to appeal).  
19 
 
II. Discussion
22
 
 
 A. Standard of Review 
 
 “In this appeal, we „stand in the shoes‟ of the District 
Court and review the Bankruptcy Court‟s decision.”  In re 
Pransky, 318 F.3d 536, 542 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting In re 
Krystal Cadillac Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc., 142 F.3d 631, 
635 (3d Cir. 1998)).  Accordingly, we review the Bankruptcy 
Court‟s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for 
clear error.  Id.   A court‟s decision regarding standing is a 
legal conclusion subject to de novo review.  Danvers Motor 
Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 
 B. Standing 
 
As alluded to previously, two types of standing are 
contested here:  Hartford‟s and Century‟s standing to object 
to the confirmation of the GIT Plan in the Bankruptcy Court 
(“bankruptcy standing”) and the standing of each of the 
                                              
22
 The District Court had original jurisdiction over the 
GIT Chapter 11 proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) 
and referred the matter to the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 157(a).  The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction 
over the plan confirmation proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1334(b).  The District Court had jurisdiction over 
Hartford‟s appeal of the confirmed reorganization plan under 
28 U.S.C. § 158(a).  We have jurisdiction over the current 
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1).  Moreover, because 
the District Court=s order affirming plan confirmation was a 
final order, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
20 
 
Objecting Insurers to appeal that confirmation ruling 
(“appellate standing”).  However, our disposition of this 
appeal treats only the first of those, bankruptcy standing.  
Because we conclude that Hartford and Century have 
bankruptcy standing and that further development of the 
factual record may aid in the resolution of other issues, 
including appellate standing, the appropriate remedy is a 
remand that will allow the Bankruptcy Court to hear Hartford 
and Century and to make a more fully informed decision.  
We, therefore, address only bankruptcy standing at this 
time.
23
 
                                              
23
 If it turns out that the Plan is not confirmed, that 
would in all likelihood render moot any consideration of other 
issues raised by the Objecting Insurers, including their 
appellate standing.  The “appellate standing” to which we 
refer and which we decline to address at this time is standing 
to appeal the substance of the bankruptcy court‟s decision.  
Standing in that regard is distinct from standing to appeal the 
bankruptcy court‟s decision regarding bankruptcy standing.  
With respect to the latter, we have stated in a non-bankruptcy 
context that “[a] party denied standing to sue, or to intervene, 
or to object, may obviously appeal such a determination.”  In 
re Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co. Sec. & Antitrust Litig., 
543 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1976).  Applying that principle 
in the bankruptcy context makes intuitive sense, since to 
require a party to satisfy the more stringent standard for 
bankruptcy appellate standing, Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d 
at 215, before addressing the question of whether the party 
satisfied the more relaxed standard for bankruptcy standing, 
PWS Holding, 228 F.3d at 249, would be putting the cart 
before the horse.  Moreover, it would risk leaving parties in 
interest who have been erroneously denied bankruptcy 
21 
 
To object to the confirmation of a reorganization plan 
in bankruptcy court, a party must, in the first instance, meet 
the requirements for standing that litigants in all federal cases 
face under Article III of the Constitution.  See Danvers, 432 
F.3d at 290-91.  A party seeking constitutional standing must 
demonstrate an “injury in fact” that is “concrete”, “distinct 
and palpable”, and “actual or imminent.”  Whitmore v. 
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990).  Additionally, the party 
must establish that the injury “fairly can be traced to the 
challenged action and is likely to be redressed by a favorable 
decision.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  We have noted 
that “[t]he contours of the injury-in-fact requirement, while 
not precisely defined, are very generous.”  Bowman v. Wilson, 
672 F.2d 1145, 1151 (3d Cir. 1982).  The standard is met as 
long as the party alleges a “specific, „identifiable trifle‟ of 
injury,” id. (quoting United States v. Students Challenging 
Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 686-90, 690 
n.14 (1973)), or a “personal stake in the outcome of [the] 
litigation,” The Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354, 360 (3d 
Cir. 2000).  See In re Congoleum Corp., 426 F.3d 675, 685 
(3d Cir. 2005) (“Article III standing need not be financial and 
only need be fairly traceable to the alleged illegal action.”). 
                                                                                                     
standing, but who do not meet the more stringent 
requirements for appellate standing, without legal redress for 
that error.  We have implicitly adhered to that principle in the 
bankruptcy context by resolving bankruptcy standing issues 
on appeal without reaching the question of bankruptcy 
appellate standing.  See, e.g., In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 
1034 (3d Cir. 1985) (addressing, inter alia, a would-be 
intervenor's “party-in-interest” standing without reaching the 
question of whether he had bankruptcy appellate standing). 
22 
 
Standing in bankruptcy cases is also governed by the 
terms of 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b), which provides that “[a] party 
in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors‟ 
committee, an equity security holders‟ committee, a creditor, 
an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee, may raise 
and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this 
chapter.”  11 U.S.C. § 1109(b).  The list of potential parties in 
interest in § 1109(b) is not exclusive.  On the contrary, that 
section “has been construed to create a broad right of 
participation in Chapter 11 cases.”  In re Combustion Eng’g, 
Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 214 n.21 (3d Cir. 2004).  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has described 
a party in interest as “anyone who has a legally protected 
interest that could be affected by a bankruptcy proceeding.”  
In re James Wilson Associates, 965 F.2d 160, 169 (7th Cir. 
1992).  That “party in interest” test comports with our own 
definition of a “party in interest” as one who “has a sufficient 
stake in the proceeding so as to require representation.”  In re 
Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1042 (3d Cir. 1985).  We thus 
adopt the test set forth by the Seventh Circuit in James Wilson 
as a helpful amplification of our definition in Amatex.  Status 
as a party in interest is of particular relevance here because 
the Bankruptcy Code expressly provides that parties in 
interest “may object to confirmation of a plan.”  11 U.S.C. 
§ 1128(b).     
 
In applying the teachings of James Wilson and Amatex, 
we are guided by our previous statement that “[s]ection 
1109(b) must be construed broadly to permit parties affected 
by a chapter 11 proceeding to appear and be heard.”  Amatex, 
755 F.2d at 1042 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The District Court described the Bankruptcy 
Code‟s “party in interest” standard as “more exacting” than 
23 
 
the constitutional injury-in-fact requirement (App. at 15),
24
 
but we think that is a misunderstanding of the Code.  
Persuasive authority indicates that Article III standing and 
standing under the Bankruptcy Code are effectively co-
extensive.  Compare, e.g., The Pitt News, 215 F.3d at 360 
(injury-in-fact requires a “personal stake” in litigation), and 
Danvers, 432 F.3d at 291 (same), with Amatex, 755 F.2d at 
1042 (party in interest must have a “sufficient stake” in 
bankruptcy proceedings).  Interpreting the “party in interest” 
requirement as an additional obstacle to bankruptcy standing 
would frustrate the purpose of § 1109(b), which was intended 
to “confer[] broad standing at the trial level,” In re PWS 
Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 249 (3d Cir. 2000), and to 
“continue[] in [the] tradition” of “encourag[ing] and 
promot[ing] greater participation in reorganization cases,”  
Amatex, 755 F.2d at 1042.
25
  
                                              
      
24
 The District Court drew that proposition from In re 
Fuller-Austin Insulation, No. 98-2038-JJF, 1998 WL 812388, 
at *3 (D. Del. 1998), an unpublished decision that relies on a 
standing analysis in bankruptcy cases under Second Circuit 
precedent.  However, that precedent established that the test 
for appellate standing, not the statutory limitation on 
bankruptcy standing, is “more exacting than the constitutional 
case or controversy requirement imposed by Article III.”  
Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 642 n.2 (2d Cir. 
1988).   Properly understood, Kane is uncontroversial and in 
accord with our own precedent.  See, e.g., Combustion Eng’g, 
391 F.3d at 215; Travelers Ins. Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 45 
F.3d 737, 741 (3d Cir. 1995). 
25
 Without a contrary signal from Congress, we will 
not read a provision that confers a broad right of participation 
24 
 
The question, then, is whether Hartford and Century 
have demonstrated some injury-in-fact, i.e., some “specific, 
„identifiable trifle‟ of injury,” Bowman, 672 F.2d at 1151, or 
“personal stake in the outcome of [the] litigation,” The Pitt 
News, 215 F.3d at 360, that is fairly traceable to the GIT 
                                                                                                     
to be a restriction on access to bankruptcy proceedings.  
Indeed, some commentators have questioned whether 
standing under § 1109(b) is broader than Article III standing.  
Paul P. Daley & George W. Shuster, Jr., Bankruptcy Court 
Jurisdiction, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 383, 405-06 
(2005); see also Nathalie D. Martin, Noneconomic Interests 
in Bankruptcy: Standing on the Outside Looking In, 59 OHIO 
ST. L. J. 429, 448-51 (1998) (arguing that parties should have 
standing to assert non-pecuniary interests in bankruptcy court 
and contending that “judges in all fora operate under a world 
view that most easily recognizes economic interests over 
other interests”).  The courts that have considered that 
question, however, have determined that bankruptcy standing 
is not broader than standing under Article III.  E.g., Baron & 
Budd, P.C. v. Unsecured Asbestos Claimants Comm., 321 
B.R. 147, 158 (D.N.J. 2005); Hobson v. Travelstead (In re 
Travelstead), 227 B.R. 638, 649-50 (D. Md. 1998); SWE & C 
Liquidating Trust v. Saudi Arabian Oil Co. (In re Stone & 
Webster, Inc.), 373 B.R. 353, 361 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007); In 
re A.P.I., Inc., 331 B.R. 828, 859-60 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005).  
Leaving aside the logical problem in thinking that the 
constitutional foundation of all standing could support a yet 
broader standing opportunity, there is no occasion for us to 
decide the issue here, because, as we discuss, we are satisfied 
that Hartford and Century have Article III standing and that 
bankruptcy standing is at least that broad. 
25 
 
Plan.
26
  To put it in “party in interest” terms, the question is 
simply whether Hartford and Century have legally protected 
interests that could be affected by the GIT Plan.  Hartford and 
Century of course assert that they do.  In essence, their 
argument is that, as funding sources who will have to address 
the liabilities of the APG Silica Trust, they have more than a 
trifling injury and certainly have a personal stake in whether 
the Plan is approved.  GIT, on the other hand, contends that 
Hartford and Century do not have standing because the Plan 
preserves their coverage defenses and therefore is “insurance 
neutral,” thus making pecuniary injury arising out of the Plan 
too speculative.
27
  
 
We addressed the concept of “insurance neutrality” in 
Combustion Engineering, holding that certain insurers there 
did not have appellate standing to challenge a plan calling for 
                                              
26
 Injury-in-fact and traceability to the GIT Plan cover 
the injury and causation elements of Article III standing.  
There is no dispute that the third element for Article III 
standing, redressability, exists, since the issues raised by 
Hartford and Century can be resolved by a ruling in their 
favor.  
27
 GIT also contends, consistent with the Bankruptcy 
Court‟s holding, that the anti-assignment provisions in the 
Objecting Insurers‟ policies are rendered null by the 
Bankruptcy Code and state law.  We need not address that 
argument here because our holding with respect to Hartford‟s 
and Century‟s bankruptcy standing is alone enough to require 
remand.  Moreover, the discussion of anti-assignment 
provisions in Combustion Engineering, 391 F.3d at 218-20, 
should suffice. 
26 
 
them to fund an asbestos trust because the plan, through its 
“neutrality” provision, neither increased the insurers‟ pre-
petition obligations nor impaired their pre-petition contractual 
rights under the subject insurance policies.  See 391 F.3d at 
218.  “Insurance neutrality” is a meaningful concept where, as 
in Combustion Engineering, a plan does not materially alter 
the quantum of liability that the insurers would be called to 
absorb.  Indeed, in Combustion Engineering, the pre-petition 
quantum of asbestos liability was known from four decades of 
asbestos litigation, and moving the pre-petition asbestos 
claims out of the tort system and into a trust system did not 
increase in any meaningful way the insurers‟ pre-petition 
exposure to asbestos liability.
28
  See Combustion Eng’g, 391 
F.3d at 200-01.   
 
Here, however, the Plan‟s promise of an APG Silica 
Trust appears to have staggeringly increased – by more than 
27 times – the pre-petition liability exposure.  Thus, on the 
record here, it cannot fairly be said that the GIT plan is 
“insurance neutral” in the same sense as was the plan at issue 
in Combustion Engineering.   
 
                                              
28
 During the plan negotiations in Combustion 
Engineering, an additional 25,000 to 30,000 additional 
claimants came forward.  391 F.3d at 205.  That number, 
while large in the abstract, does not represent a material 
increase in pre-petition obligations when one considers that 
Combustion Engineering had, from the mid-1970s to 2002, 
dealt with hundreds of thousands of asbestos claims.  See id. 
at 203. 
27 
 
Nor do we think the plan‟s adverse effects on Hartford 
and Century are too speculative to be recognized.  In Clinton 
v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), the Supreme Court 
acknowledged the standing of two groups of plaintiffs who 
were seeking to challenge the Line Item Veto Act.
29
  One 
group, the City of New York and various healthcare 
providers, claimed an injury stemming from the President‟s 
veto of a statutory provision forgiving the State of New York 
a healthcare-related, multi-billion-dollar tax debt to the 
United States.  Id. at 425-26.  Without that forgiveness, the 
City and the healthcare providers were required to make 
retroactive tax payments to the State, unless the Department 
of Health and Human Services granted a request that the State 
had made for a waiver of the debt.  Id. at 422, 430.  The 
federal Government argued that the injury was too 
speculative to create standing because the State‟s waiver 
request was still pending.  Id. at 430.  But the Supreme Court 
disagreed, comparing the veto to 
 
the judgment of an appellate court setting aside 
a verdict for the defendant and remanding for a 
new trial of a multibillion dollar damages claim.  
Even if the outcome of the second trial is 
speculative, the reversal, like the President‟s 
cancellation, causes a significant immediate 
                                              
29
 The Line Item Veto Act of 1996, 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-
692 (1996), gave the President power to cancel certain types 
of statutory provisions that had been signed into law.  See 
Clinton, 524 U.S. at 420-21, 436.  The Supreme Court 
ultimately held the Act to be unconstitutional as a violation of 
the Presentment Clause, Article I, § 7.  See id. at 447-48.     
28 
 
injury by depriving the defendant of a favorable 
final judgment.  The revival of a substantial 
contingent liability immediately and directly 
affects the borrowing power, financial strength, 
and fiscal planning of the potential obligor. 
 
Id. at 430-31. 
 
The second group of plaintiffs in Clinton was a 
farmers‟ cooperative representing potato growers and an 
individual member of that cooperative.  Those plaintiffs 
challenged the veto of a limited tax benefit that Congress had 
enacted to enable the transfer of commodity processing 
facilities to farmers‟ cooperatives.  Id. at 425, 432.  Again, the 
Government contended that the plaintiffs‟ injuries were too 
speculative, this time because there was no guarantee that, 
absent the veto, the cooperative would have been able to 
purchase a processing facility.  Id. at 430-32.  And, again, the 
Court rejected the Government=s argument.  Id. at 432.  The 
President, according to the Court, had deprived the 
cooperative of a “statutory bargaining chip, ... inflict[ing] a 
sufficient likelihood of economic injury to establish standing 
under our precedents.”  Id. (citations omitted).   
 
By acknowledging the standing of the New York 
healthcare providers and New York City, as well as the 
farmers‟ cooperative, the Supreme Court established that an 
injury‟s having a contingent aspect does not necessarily make 
that injury incognizable under Article III.  Clinton recognizes 
that a tangible disadvantage to the affected party can lead to 
standing.
30
 
                                              
30 
The Dissent would restrict Clinton solely to cases of 
29 
 
Here, the plan‟s creation of the APG Silica Trust led to 
a manifold increase in silica-related claims.  That constitutes 
a tangible disadvantage to Hartford and Century, which, 
despite having their coverage defenses available, will be 
faced with coverage obligations to the APG Silica Trust in a 
world that recognizes the existence of over 4,600 silica-
related claims, as opposed to a pre-Plan world that recognized 
only 169.  Indeed, the Plan-triggered explosion of new claims 
creates an entirely new set of administrative costs, including 
the investigative burden of finding any meritorious suits in 
the haystack of potentially fraudulent ones.  Those costs will 
be enormous, even if Hartford and Century never pay a single 
                                                                                                     
judicial review of legislation.  Nothing in Clinton itself 
warrants that limitation, nor does the decision of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
that the Dissent cites.  That decision, Newdow v. Roberts, 603 
F.3d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 2010), distinguished Clinton from the 
controversy then before the D.C. Circuit by noting that the 
plaintiffs in Newdow were not asking the Court to serve as an 
interpreter of statutory text but were objecting to religious 
elements in President Obama‟s inaugural ceremony.  Not 
surprisingly, the D.C. Circuit observed that a “decision 
committed to the executive discretion of the President or the 
personal discretion of the President-elect” is far different 
from a statute, as was at issue in Clinton.  Id. at 1012.  We 
certainly agree that “[a] court-whether via injunctive or 
declaratory relief-does not sit in judgment of a President's 
executive decisions.”  That, however, has nothing to do with 
the standing issue before us, contrary to the implication of the 
Dissent. 
30 
 
dollar of indemnity.
31
  Accordingly, even if Hartford‟s and 
Century‟s ultimate liability is contingent, the harm to 
Hartford and Century from the Plan is hardly too speculative 
for them to be parties in interest. 
 
The suspect circumstances surrounding the creation of 
the APG Silica Trust and the questionable provenance of the 
silica-related claims also fall in favor of recognizing Hartford 
and Century as parties in interest.  We held in Congoleum that 
insurers had appellate standing to raise an issue regarding 
disqualification of counsel, reasoning that the issue 
“implicate[d] the integrity of the bankruptcy court proceeding 
as a whole” and would “affect the fairness of the entire 
bankruptcy proceeding.”  426 F.3d at 685.  In addition, we 
noted that granting standing to those insurers was appropriate, 
                                              
31
 The real and immediate cost of exponentially 
increased liability exposure and new administrative burdens is 
ignored by our dissenting colleagues, who claim that “[t]he 
fact that the policies are unchanged by the Reorganization 
Plan is dispositive.”  (Dissent slip op. at 5.)  Even on the 
Dissent‟s terms, however, focusing just on contract law, it is 
not accurate to say that the contract language alone is the be-
all and end-all for resolving a dispute.   “The important 
question is whether an unanticipated circumstance has made 
performance of the promise vitally different from what should 
reasonably have been within the contemplation of both parties 
when they entered into the contract.  If so, the risk should not 
fairly be thrown upon the promisor.”  City of Littleton v. 
Employers Fire Ins. Co., 453 P.2d 810, 812 (Colo. 1969) 
(quoting 6 Williston, Contracts § 1931 (rev. ed.)).  
31 
 
since it was “highly unlikely that any of the parties other than 
the insurers” would raise the issue.  Id. at 687.   
 
Here, the integrity of the bankruptcy proceeding is 
called into question by nonfrivolous allegations of collusion 
between GIT and the asbestos claimants‟ counsel in 
negotiating the establishment of the APG Silica Trust and 
Silica Injunction.  Not to put too fine a point on it, the 
assertion is that GIT sold out Hartford, Century, and 
similarly-situated insurers by setting up a system in which 
they would pay for newly ginned-up silica claims in exchange 
for the asbestos claimants casting their votes in favor of the 
GIT Plan.  It is a profoundly serious charge and not without 
record support.  Moreover, it is a charge that apparently no 
one has an incentive to pursue, other than the insurers slated 
to provide coverage to the APG Silica Trust.  Since the 
circumstances in Congoleum gave rise to the “more 
restrictive” appellate standing for the insurers there, id. at 
685, we think the circumstances here, which may be more 
disturbing, certainly give rise to bankruptcy standing for 
Hartford and Century.
32
 
                                              
32
 The Dissent evidently dismisses our standing 
analysis as founded on nothing more than a naïve concern 
about some largely imagined and contingent occurrence of 
the sort common to insurers‟ risk-taking.  (See Dissent slip 
op. at 6-7 (“[T]o say that an insurance company is worried 
that its risk for future indemnity obligations might be larger 
than it projected when it established the insurance policy is 
another way of describing the leitmotif of the insurance 
industry within the normal course of business.”).)   Whatever 
else the normal course of the insurance business may entail, 
though, it certainly ought not include judicial approval for 
32 
 
In sum, we conclude that Hartford and Century have 
legally protected interests as insurers on policies to be 
transferred to the APG Silica Trust and that their interests are 
affected by the GIT Plan such that they should have an 
opportunity to challenge the Plan in the Bankruptcy Court.  
Recognizing Hartford‟s and Century‟s bankruptcy standing is 
particularly appropriate because the challenges they want to 
bring implicate the integrity of the bankruptcy process.   
 
We are aware that, although the Bankruptcy Court 
denied Hartford and Century standing, it considered many of 
the issues that Hartford and Century press in regard to the 
APG Silica Trust and Silica Injunction.  But Hartford‟s and 
Century‟s entitlement to appear as parties in interest remains, 
even if the Bankruptcy Court may have considered some of 
the issues previously.  Furthermore, while we appreciate the 
analysis evident in the Bankruptcy Court‟s opinion, we think 
that, on this record, a more searching review of Hartford‟s 
and Century‟s allegations of collusion between the debtors 
and counsel for the silica claimants is warranted.
33
  On 
                                                                                                     
liability manufactured by and for the benefit of the insured, as 
is the central concern in this appeal.  That concern goes 
unaddressed by the Dissent, despite our precedent in 
Congoleum, and should be sufficient itself to demonstrate that 
the Dissent‟s cry of “staggering” implications for Article III 
standing (Dissent slip op. at 8) is greatly exaggerated. 
33
 The Dissent insists that the Bankruptcy Court has 
already conducted the most searching review possible.  
(Dissent slip op. at n.2.)  It is theoretically possible that that 
will turn out to be true, but we are not prepared to say so in 
advance, as does the Dissent.  Rather, we accept the logical 
33 
 
remand, the Bankruptcy Court should make sufficient 
findings regarding those allegations so that, in the event there 
is a further appeal, a determination can be made on whether 
there is a legitimate basis for concluding that the APG Silica 
Trust and Silica Injunction are necessary to the reorganization 
and fair.
34
   
 
Because of the need to supplement the factual record, 
we defer consideration of the merits of the Objecting 
Insurers‟ arguments regarding the lawfulness of the APG 
Silica Trust and Silica Injunction, which are questions that 
can best be answered in the first instance by the Bankruptcy 
Court after all of the parties have had a full opportunity to 
                                                                                                     
proposition that a party, granted standing and a full 
opportunity to participate, may add something meaningful to 
the record on which the Bankruptcy Court is called to make a 
decision.  We do not denigrate the work done by the 
Bankruptcy Court already, but neither do we believe it has 
done all that is necessary, including rendering some judgment 
regarding the allegations of fraud and collusion advanced by 
the Objecting Insurers.   
34
 If it approves a plan of reorganization for GIT that 
includes a channeling injunction and trust for silicosis claims, 
the Bankruptcy Court may also need to address the 
procedures by which the trust calls for claim funds to be 
distributed.  For example, it may be advisable to examine 
whether those procedures would require claims to be paid 
based upon proof of exposure and diagnosis alone, without 
regard to any affirmative defenses available under state law, 
and, if so, whether those procedures would then cause the 
trust to violate 11 U.S.C. § 502, as argued by AIG. 
34 
 
present evidence and argument.
35
  We likewise decline at this 
time to address whether the Objecting Insurers‟ have 
appellate standing, as it is unnecessary to our decision 
regarding bankruptcy standing and also because the 
Bankruptcy Court‟s disposition on remand may alter the 
analysis.
36
  
 
III. Conclusion 
 
Because Hartford and Century meet the standing 
requirements prescribed by Article III and the Bankruptcy 
Code, they must be afforded the opportunity to be heard 
concerning whether it is lawful to channel silica-related 
                                              
35
 The Dissent questions whether we generally oppose 
the use of settlement trusts to address mass tort liability.  We 
of course do not, but do question the record support to date 
for the establishment of such a trust in this case.   
36
 In examining whether parties are “persons 
aggrieved” for purposes of appellate standing in a bankruptcy 
case, we are particularly concerned with separating those who 
are “directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by an order or 
decree of the bankruptcy court,” from “the myriad of parties 
… indirectly affected by every bankruptcy court order.”  
Combustion Eng’g, 391, F.3d at 214-15 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Because we cannot now know the contours 
of any revised order the Bankruptcy Court might issue on 
remand, any inquiry into the directness or indirectness of the 
Objecting Insurers‟ injury would be premature.  Should this 
same issue arise again after remand, however, we trust that 
the implications of our decision in Congoleum will be taken 
into account. 
35 
 
claims against GIT into a settlement trust in the context of 
GIT‟s reorganization.  Thus, we will vacate the District 
Court‟s order and require remand of the matter to the 
Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
In re Global Industrial Technologies, No. 08-3650 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, with whom Circuit Judges 
SCIRICA, FUENTES, and FISHER join, dissenting. 
 
 The majority’s grant of standing to parties who have 
no injury, either actual or contingent, is a departure from the 
well-established requisite of an injury in fact, and it has broad 
deleterious implications for the jurisprudence of Article III 
standing.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
564 n.2 (1992).  To be clear, nothing in the record—amassed 
over five years with the full participation of the excess 
insurers—and nothing in the Reorganization Plan itself, 
substantiates the excess insurers’ claims that they have 
incurred or will incur an injury in fact as a result of Global’s 
petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.   
 
 Moreover, fully aware of past abuse in the realm of 
silicosis claims in unrelated cases in other courts, the 
Bankruptcy Court in this case established the facial 
legitimacy of claims by requiring a proffer of information 
from claimants under penalty of perjury.  Most importantly, 
Hartford, Century and AIG have conceded any challenge to 
the court’s factual findings in this regard.1  Relying upon 
                                              
 
1
 In their reply brief Hartford and Century conceded 
their challenges to assertions of the Bankruptcy Court’s 
factual error, clarifying that:  “the [B]ankruptcy [C]ourt erred 
in granting the §105 injunction not because its findings of fact 
were erroneous, but rather because it failed to make - and on 
the record could not make - the specific and concrete findings 
to support the showing of “necessity” that Continental 
2 
 
these findings, and those regarding the reorganized entity’s 
financial viability (that are also unchallenged by the excess 
insurers), the Bankruptcy Court already established the 
necessity of the Silica Trust.
2
  Finally, from a practical 
perspective, the majority’s remand will needlessly delay an 
already protracted proceeding to rehash a record that is 
already complete, a move that may very well imperil 
                                                                                                     
requires.”  (Emphasis added.)  AIG fully adopted the 
arguments of Hartford, and did not provide any indication to 
this Court that it disagrees with this particular statement.  I 
note also that references to “Hartford,” “Century” and “AIG” 
are consistent with their use in the majority opinion.  
 
 
2I reject the multiple inferences throughout the 
majority opinion that the Bankruptcy Court conducted 
anything less than a thorough, responsible investigation into 
every claim raised by the insurers.  Indeed, the suggestion 
that the Bankruptcy Court should, on remand, conduct a 
“more searching review of Hartford and Century’s 
allegations” belies the record in this case.  Having failed to 
impress the Bankruptcy Court with its claims of rampant 
fraud and collusion through nothing more than bald, 
unsubstantiated inference, the majority now apparently seeks 
to give these insurers a second bite of the apple to make a 
case that is fatally flawed.  Unless the majority is suggesting 
that Bankruptcy Court should provide a forum for their 
premature coverage claims—an instruction that would raise 
further justiciability issues—it is my position that it has 
conducted an admirable, exhaustive review.  For that reason, I 
believe that a section 105 injunction would be warranted even 
if Hartford and Century had standing. 
 
3 
 
financing on which the reorganized entity is relying to 
succeed.  This contravenes the intent of the Bankruptcy Code, 
and seriously undermines a process authorized by Congress to 
address asbestos claims.  See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g).
3
  For all of 
these reasons, I dissent.   
 
 The excess insurers conjure up an injury through the 
Plan’s supposed impact on the insurance contracts.  However, 
three technical amendments to the Reorganization Plan, 
explicitly considered by the Bankruptcy Court, ensure that the 
contractual relationship between the insurers and insured 
emerges post-reorganization unchanged.  
  
4.4.1  No Preclusion from 
Asserting Claims, etc.  Nothing in 
the GIT Plan, in any of the Plan 
Documents, or in the 
Confirmation Order shall preclude 
any Entity from asserting in any 
proceedings any and all claims, 
defenses, rights, or causes of 
                                              
 
3If the central issue for the majority is a general 
opposition to the use of settlement trusts to resolve claims of 
this sort, I regard Congress as the proper forum for resolving 
such concerns rather than the judiciary.  See Lloyd Dixon, 
Geoffrey McGovern, & Amy Coombe, Asbestos Bankruptcy 
Trusts:  An Overview of Trust Structure and Activity with 
Detailed Reports on the Largest Trusts, Rand, Institute for 
Civil Justice (2010).  To be sure, numerous questions persist 
in the complex realm of asbestosis and silicosis claim 
litigation.  Yet, we must work with the statutes, our 
precedent, and the record as it is, not as we wish it to be. 
4 
 
action that it has or may have 
under or in connection with any of 
the APG Silica Trust Policies, 
except claims, defenses, rights or 
causes of action held by an insurer 
that are based on or arise out of 
any “anti-assignment” 
provision(s) in such policies.  
Subject to the foregoing, and to 
the provisions of Section 4.4.2 
and 4.4.3, nothing in the GIT 
Plan, in any of the Plan 
Documents, or in the 
Confirmation Order shall be 
deemed to waive any claims, 
defenses, rights or causes of 
action that any Entity has or may 
have under the provisions, terms, 
conditions, defenses and/or 
exclusions contained in the APG 
Silica Trust Policies, including 
(but not limited to) any and all 
such claims, defenses, rights or 
causes of action based upon or 
arising out of any APG Silica 
Trust Claim that is liquidated, 
resolved, discharged, channeled 
or paid in connection with the 
GIT Plan. 
 
4.4.2 No Impairment of Rights.  
Notwithstanding anything to the 
contrary in the GIT Plan, in any of 
5 
 
the Plan Documents, or in the 
Confirmation Order, nothing in 
the GIT Plan, the Plan Documents 
or the Confirmation Order 
(including any other provision 
that purports to be preemptory or 
supervening) shall in any way 
operate to, or have the effect of, 
impairing any insurer’s legal, 
equitable or contractual rights 
under the APG Silica Trust 
Policies in any respect other than 
the enforcement of any “anti-
assignment” provision(s) in such 
policies.  Subject to the foregoing, 
the rights of the insurers shall be 
determined according to the terms 
of the APG Silica Trust Policies, 
as applicable. 
 
4.4.3 No Assertion of 
Preclusion, etc.  Notwithstanding 
anything to the contrary in the 
GIT Plan, in any of the Plan 
Documents, or in the 
Confirmation Order, under no 
circumstances shall any person or 
Entity be permitted to assert issue 
preclusion or claim preclusion, 
waiver, estoppel, consent, or any 
other legal or equitable theory 
against any insurer under any 
APG Silica Trust Policy as to the 
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existence, enforceability or 
amount of any APG Silica Claim 
or Demand on the basis of the 
submission, valuation, resolution 
and/or payment of any APG Silica 
Trust Claim by the APG Silica 
Trust.  The submission of an APG 
Trust Claim by a claimant, and 
valuation, resolution and/or 
payment of an APG Silica Trust 
Claim by the APG Silica Trust, 
shall be wholly without prejudice 
to any and all rights of the parties 
in all other contexts or forums, 
and shall not be deemed (unless 
otherwise determined by a Court 
of competent jurisdiction) to be a 
triggering event for liability under 
any APG Silica Trust Policy.  
 
Third Amended Plan of Reorganization of Global Industrial 
Technologies, Inc., ET AL., 23, December 8, 2005, ECF No. 
7827.  The record contains lengthy, substantive, discussion of 
these provisions, making clear the intent of the Trustee to 
mirror the language used in In re Combustion Engineering, 
Inc., which we characterized as insurance-neutral.  391 F. 3d 
190, 218 (3d Cir. 2004).  The majority distinguishes the 
instant case from Combustion Engineering by asserting that 
the “quantum of liability” post-petition for the excess insurers 
is proportionately larger in this case.  Yet, leaving aside for 
the moment the fact that the record does not support an 
assertion of increased liability for the excess insurers, the 
majority fails to explain how this is even relevant to the 
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analysis.  Combustion Engineering’s characterization of these 
provisions as insurance-neutral is integral to its holding and 
must be followed here.  As a result, the majority errs factually 
and as a matter of law by implying that the Reorganization 
Plan causes an injury in fact to the excess insurers by 
modifying the terms of the insurance contracts.
4
  
 
 Therefore, even if we accept the worst-case scenario 
posited by Hartford and Century, where the Silica Trust 
actually settles claims in excess of the thirty-five million 
dollar fund established in the Plan, and it submits claims of 
indemnity that the excess insurers regard as beyond the scope 
of coverage, fraudulent, or over-valued, they are still not 
injured.  This is so because they have the same full range of 
contractual rights to protect their interests for which they 
bargained at the inception of the insurance contracts pre-
petition.  Indeed, the excess insurers themselves admitted that 
the Silica Trust would still face the burden of first 
establishing its right to coverage under the pre-petition 
policies.  For these reasons, the record does not support the 
majority’s assertion that these claims represent a contingent 
liability sufficient to ground standing.  Given the multitude of 
                                              
 
4
 In footnotes 20 and 23, the majority does not clearly 
articulate a position on whether the anti-assignment 
provisions of this Reorganization Plan constitute a contractual 
injury, given our holding in Combustion Engineering that 
validated the Bankruptcy Code’s authorization to preempt 
anti-assignment policy provisions.  319 F.3d at 218-20.  I 
interpret our holding in Combustion Engineering on anti-
assignment provisions as both fully applicable to this case and 
regard it as binding precedent that eliminates any claim by the 
insurers that this provision is the source of any injury.     
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variables at issue here, the only reliable points of reference 
with respect to the excess insurers are the insurance contracts.  
The fact that the policies are unchanged by the 
Reorganization Plan is dispositive.  
  
 Moreover, contrary to the majority’s assertion, 
jurisprudence on standing does not support their position in 
this case.  They point to the holding in Clinton v. New York, 
524 U.S. 417, 429-436 (1998) to suggest that the Supreme 
Court has already extended the bounds of Article III standing 
to include entities that present nothing more than a possibility 
of future impacts.  Yet, as noted by the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia, Clinton is properly read precisely 
for what it is:  “a basic case of judicial review of legislation.”  
Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d 1002, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
The entities involved here were in the highly unusual 
circumstance of asserting standing to challenge the 
President’s line item veto of specific legislative provisions 
that had been crafted and duly authorized by Congress for 
their benefit.  Without the grant of standing, the parties in 
Clinton v. New York would have been denied access to any 
judicial fora to launch their case because the intended 
legislated benefits vanished with the veto before they became 
law.  Within this highly unusual context, there was a clear 
rationale for the Supreme Court to stretch the requirements of 
constitutional standing to recognize specific, prospective 
benefits of the legislation, and the impacts of the loss of those 
benefits, to enable a constitutional challenge to the 
President’s line item veto.   
  
 The majority’s reliance upon Clinton in this case, 
where it is beyond question that the excess insurers will—if 
needed—have standing to raise contractual issues in court at 
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the appropriate time and place, uproots long held and 
traditional principles of standing.  See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 
n.2 (“It has been stretched beyond the breaking point when, 
as here, the plaintiff alleges only an injury at some indefinite 
future time, and the acts necessary to make the injury happen 
are at least partly within the plaintiff's own control.”)  
Moreover, in its haste to give the excess insurers standing to 
challenge this Reorganization Plan the majority dilutes the 
definition of injury in fact, with alarming consequences.  
  
 The closest that the majority comes to actually 
describing the impact that the Reorganization Plan might 
have upon the excess insurers is to say that their “quantum of 
liability” might be impacted in the future, or that there might 
be a “tangible disadvantage.”  Yet, to say that an insurance 
company is worried that its risk for future indemnity 
obligations might be larger than it projected when it 
established the insurance policy is another way of describing 
the leitmotif of the insurance industry within its normal 
course of business.  That, at some point in the future, the 
scope of coverage determined by an insurer at a policy’s 
inception may include liabilities that the insurer failed to 
consider when it priced the policy is of no moment to the 
bankruptcy proceedings.  Moreover, even if an insurer may 
incur costs in conducting claim evaluations and other 
expenses in litigating those they deny, none of this puts the 
insurer outside of the milieu in which it operates day to day.  
Considering all of this, I cannot find any rationale to extend 
the definition of injury in fact to include the risks that occur 
to insurers within the normal course of their business.  
Particularly given the highly speculative nature of the impacts 
claimed here, the Bankruptcy Court correctly kept its eye on 
the ball, ascertaining whether the Reorganization Plan altered 
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the contractual relationship between insurers and insured.  It 
did not err in concluding that this relationship remains 
unaltered post-reorganization.  
 
 Moreover, by misapplying Clinton, the majority 
generally lowers, at a minimum, the threshold for injury in 
fact to include anyone who can conjure up the mere risk of a 
future business impact.  The majority’s detour from the 
standard analytic pathway for determining contingent injury 
ensures that bankruptcy courts will, henceforth, be burdened 
with determining whether sufficient injury exists among a 
broad new class of persons who, to obtain party in interest 
standing, may now allege only a fear that future business 
dealings with the reorganized entity may result in less profit 
than projected.
5
  In my view, the effects of this type of 
approach to Article III standing beyond the realm of 
bankruptcy are staggering.  
 
 I agree with the majority’s statement that party in 
interest standing is to be broadly construed.  However, I 
disagree that a generous interpretation of Article III standing 
in the bankruptcy context should extend to entities that have, 
in spite of ample opportunity, utterly failed to provide any 
evidence that the Reorganization Plan inflicts any injury upon 
them.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  
                                              
 
5
 One can also reasonably posit collateral 
complications to the general analysis of the justiciability of 
claims if the majority’s position is applied to the doctrine of 
ripeness, given the obvious intent of the insurers to launch 
premature coverage disputes. 
